From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944 Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 1 (Modern War Studies) by Charles J. Dick

Author:Charles J. Dick [Dick, Charles J.]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Published: 2016-11-07T05:00:00+00:00

On 13 September Eisenhower issued a new directive that stated:

The general plan is to push forward our forces to the Rhine, secure bridgeheads over that river, seize the Ruhr and then concentrate our forces preparatory to a final non-stop drive into Germany. During this time we must secure the following bases: Northern Group of Armies must secure the approaches to Antwerp or to Rotterdam quickly so that one of these ports . . . can provide adequate maintenance for them deep into the heart of Germany; they must also secure other Channel ports. Central Group of Armies must reduce Brest promptly so that this place may be available for staging our troops. It is important too that physical junction should be established between Southern Group of Armies in their advance from the south and the right of Central Group of Armies so that the supply lines from Marseilles may assist in supporting the right of Central Group. . . . My plan of maneuver is to push hard over the Rhine in the north with the Northern Group of Armies, First US Army and First Allied Airborne Army, while Third US Army, except for a limited advance . . . [is] to hold adequate bridgeheads beyond the Moselle thus creating a constant threat to the enemy and preventing him from reinforcing further north by transferring troops from the Metz area. As soon as this is accomplished all possible resources from Central Group of Armies must be thrown into the support of First Army’s drive to seize bridgeheads near Cologne and Bonn in preparation for assisting in the capture of the Ruhr.12

After bridgeheads were secured in the north, Third Army was to advance through the Saar and establish its own bridgeheads across the Rhine. Logistic priority would go to securing bridgeheads on the left, save for providing adequate security and reconnaissance on the right and securing and developing ports.

Bradley had objected strongly to Montgomery’s plan and was not pleased with this new directive. He still wished to make his main effort south of the Ardennes on a general Metz-Frankfurt axis. To this end, he had altered the 29 August allocation of scarce fuel supplies to favor Third Army and reinforced it at the expense of Hodges’s left wing. He now set about persuading the Supreme Commander to modify his decision again. On 14 September Bradley announced that Patton had crossed the Moselle in force and suggested that Third Army be allowed to continue its advance; if it made little progress over the following forty-eight hours, he could shift its efforts north-ward. Eisenhower agreed that, provided Montgomery received the maintenance promised him and Hodges was sufficiently supplied to reach his first principal objective, there was no reason why Patton should not continue acting offensively, as long as conditions were favorable.

Of course, Montgomery was concerned that such concessions to 12 Army Group were diluting the declared main effort and ran the risk that no blow would be hard enough to be decisive. Perhaps somewhat disingenuously, Eisenhower reassured him.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.